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Even if the main criminals of an organization are 
incarcerated, they will be replaced by others who would 
continue illegal activities, unless their financial assets 
are removed. Thus, civil forfeiture intends to dismantle 
the economic infrastructure of drug trafficking networks.  
Civil forfeiture considers the property as guilty, 
rather than the owner, and it may exist even if there is 
not a criminal action. Therefore, it is claimed that police 
agencies have chosen easy targets, such as wealthy drug 
users rather than major drug traffickers. Consequently, it 
has been particularly challenged on the basis of the 
Excessive Fines, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses. 
The use of criminal forfeiture instead of civil 
forfeiture and the elimination of the equitable sharing 
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Hume (1751) in his essay asserts that public utility 
is the sole justification for justice. The rules and 
regulations that are the practical embodiment of justice 
are only valuable if they are conducive to the public good. 
In other words, justice would not be considered a virtue 
unless it were shown to contribute to the public good. 
Hobbes (1651), however, maintains that justice functions to 
ensure the safety and security of society. Locke (1690) 
speaks on the topic as well, stating that the principal 
role of justice is to protect private property. Private 
property is to be considered a natural right, and should 
consequently be protected (Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1690; Hume, 
1751).  
Punishment, on the other hand, is an inevitable aspect 
of justice. There are lawbreakers in every society, 
regardless of the laws and the characteristics of that 
society. Punishment must exist to enforce the law. The 
question here, however, is what the purpose of the 
punishment will be. Will punishment be exacted for revenge, 
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retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation? According to 
Nozick (1974), revenge is a personal attitude, and is a 
response to an action that is not necessarily wrong. 
Retribution, however, is not personal and it is always for 
wrongdoing (Nozick, 1974).  
Bentham (1789) argues that punishment must be 
performed in order to preserve the public good. Even 
innocent people could be punished for the sake of the 
public good. Kant, on the other hand, asserts that 
punishment exists because people commit crimes. Crime must 
be punished to balance the scales, an equality principle. 
Moreover, Beccaria notes the importance of proportionality, 
stating that punishment should not exceed the harm caused 
by the crime (Bentham, 1789; Akers, 2000). 
The goal of punishment is important because it is 
considered to be indicative of the principles that are 
central to a given society. Retribution, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and deterrence are the four principle 
objectives of punishment in the United States criminal 
justice system (Cole and Smith, 2001).  
Retribution is a justification for punishment that 
argues the guilty must be punished because criminal actions 
simply 'deserve' to be punished. Retribution provides for 
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proportionality between the punishment and the crime 
(Inciardi, 1999). 
Rehabilitation is a strategy of punishment that seeks 
to prevent future crimes by curing the “illness” of 
offenders. The state attempts to reintroduce the offenders 
into society by changing their behaviors through 
rehabilitation. This is a different approach than the other 
types of sentencing philosophies. The rehabilitation 
approach embodies a more optimistic attitude toward the 
behavior of the offender. However, some argue that 
rehabilitation cannot serve its goals because it is not 
available in many institutions. Also, it is said that 
rehabilitation has not been proven to contribute to crime 
reduction (Inciardi, 1999). 
Incapacitation is a strategy of punishment that 
advocates the removal of criminals from the community in 
order to ensure the security of the community. Dangerous 
offenders are removed from society through 
institutionalization, imprisonment, or execution (Inciardi, 
1999). 
Deterrence can either be specific or general. Specific 
deterrence consists of punishing an individual so that he 
will not commit a crime again. General deterrence, on the 
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other hand, punishes the individual to serve as an example 
to society, thereby discouraging others from committing the 
same crime. As a result of high recidivism and crime rates, 
it is said that deterrence is not a viable crime prevention 
theory (Inciardi, 1999; Akers, 2000). 
Many theorists and practitioners consider deterrence 
to be the main purpose of punishment. As a result, they 
claim that when a criminal is punished by the state, his 
punishment discourages him from committing future crimes. 
At the same time, the public at large will be deterred 
because they see the example of this man who is punished, 
an example they do not want to follow (Akers, 2000). 
Police, prosecutors, and judges are the primary actors 
in the criminal justice system. The police are the 
initiators; every individual who enters the criminal 
justice comes into contact first with the police, thus any 
decisions made by the police affect every part of the 
system (Inciardi, 1999; Cole and Smith, 2001). One of the 
unique aspects of the criminal justice system is the fact 
that almost all law enforcement personnel must use some 
degree of discretion when carrying out their duties 
(Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter, 2000; Cole and Smith, 
2001).  
 5 
Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter (2000) claim that 
despite the fact that the law applies to everyone equally, 
it can be applied only to visible crimes and its 
application is sometimes biased. In fact, police use 
discretion at the very beginning when deciding whether to 
make an arrest. Prosecutors use discretion in deciding what 
charges to pursue. Even judges, perhaps especially judges, 
use their discretionary powers when making decisions 
(Kappeler, et al. 2000; Whitebread and Slobogin, 2000). The 
use of discretion, particularly at the early stages of the 
criminal justice system, is very important because some 
laws enable law enforcers to take advantage of the public 
and abuse human rights. This is especially true when the 
effectiveness of a criminal justice agency is measured by 
the profits that they will gain from asset seizures 
(Bertram, Blachman, and Andreas, 1996). 
Asset Forfeiture As Drug Policy 
 In fact, because of the practice of asset forfeiture, 
the efficiency of drug enforcers is measured by the amount 
of money they seize rather than the degree to which they 
are able to eradicate drugs or interfere with drug 
trafficking. Both of these tasks are the stated goals of 
the United States drug policy (Lynch, 2000). The focus of 
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current impact analyses, then, is misplaced on the income 
generated by the law enforcers, rather than effectiveness 
of the drug policy (Kappeler, et al. 2000).  
 Although there are two types of asset forfeiture, 
criminal and civil, civil asset forfeiture is the focus of 
this study. This is primarily due to the fact that there is 
a considerable amount of governmental focus on civil asset 
forfeiture. This focus has drawn much criticism from those 
who believe the government should place more emphasis on 
criminal asset forfeiture.  
 In fact, when the Crime Control Act of 1984 opened the 
floodgates to civil asset forfeiture, effectively enabling 
police agencies to keep the proceeds from forfeiture, civil 
asset forfeiture became one of the main tools of law 
enforcement agencies (Cassidy, 1993; Burnham, 1996). Since 
then, forfeiture has taken its place alongside federal 
funds, donations, and police taxes as an essential part of 
the police funds-generating process (Swanson, Taylor, and 
Territo, 2001).  
 Thus, police agencies consider civil asset forfeiture 
to be a useful tool that provides an easy and lucrative 
income (Cassidy, 1993). Sometimes, agencies will even 
create a forfeiture account, in which money obtained 
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through forfeiture in drug-related cases is used, in turn, 
to buy narcotics in sting operations (Hart, 2001).  
Many scholars regard the United States drug policy as 
an unsuccessful failure. This perception of failure has 
resulted in a search for ways to overcome the problems 
associated with it. Everything from increased use of the 
death penalty to drug legalization has been considered as 
an alternative for dealing with the drug problem. Asset 
forfeiture as another alternative was exercised for the 
first time by the government against drug traffickers under 
the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970 (Miller and Selva, 1994; Benson and 
Rasmussen, 1996; Holden-Rhodes, 1997; Jordan, 1999). Asset 
forfeiture was adopted to act as a deterrence mechanism in 
the fight against drugs (Austin v. United States 1993). 
The Asset Forfeiture Fund was considered to have a 
significant effect on illicit drug traffickers by 
restricting their financial income, thereby decreasing 
their illegal activity. However, criticisms were raised 
that this practice resulted in the abandonment of 
traditional retribution and deterrence policies, replacing 
them with a profit-seeking agenda (Miller and Selva, 1994; 
Ross, 2000). Therefore, it is argued that not only did 
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forfeiture laws harm the American justice system by 
encouraging highly criticized implementations of the laws, 
they also changed the attitude of the police agencies 
towards the drug war by creating financial motivation among 
them. Hence, the main goal of this study is to examine the 
practice of drug-related civil asset forfeiture, both past 
and present, in the United States.  
Research Purpose, Objectives, and Questions 
The purpose of this study is to examine drug-related 
civil asset forfeiture in the United States. Among police 
and scholars there is some debate about the utility of 
civil asset forfeiture. Law enforcement agencies consider 
civil asset forfeiture to be an important tool that they 
can use to supplement their budget. Others, however, argue 
that civil asset forfeiture is used arbitrarily to the 
disadvantage of innocent citizens. Thus, despite the fact 
that it is a frequently used tool of law enforcement 
agencies, civil asset forfeiture has received much 
criticism from a wide range of scholars as well as 




Therefore, it is the intention of this paper to answer 
the following three questions: 
1- What role does civil asset forfeiture play in the 
war on drugs? 
2- What are the major Supreme Court cases on drug-
related civil asset forfeiture? 
3- What are the consequences of drug-related civil 
asset forfeiture?  
Definition of Terms 
 There is no real consensus on the definition of the 
word “drug” in the literature. The definition of a drug may 
sometimes be attributed to whether the substance is legal 
or illegal. However, drugs are sometimes classified by 
whether they are addictive, and by whether they cause 
psychological or physiological dependence, or both. 
Problems arise when trying to define the word “drug” mainly 
because the definition can be manipulated to serve the 
needs of the people who use it. That is, a substance can be 
legal or illegal in different time periods. Legality may 
also depend on the type of people who use a particular 
drug. For example, morphine is a vital medication that 
physicians frequently prescribe to patients to deaden 
severe pain. However, it is illegal to use the same drug 
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for other, non-medical purposes (Istralowitz and Telias 
1998). For the purpose of this study, the word “drug” will 
be used to refer to a controlled substance. This definition 
is outlined in the Controlled Substance Act, Section 102 
(DEA, 2001). 
The origins of civil forfeiture are related to the 
principle of “deodand,” a word derived from the Latin “deo 
dandum” meaning “given to God.” Deodand meant that an 
object was subject to forfeiture to God, and was therefore 
to be given to Gods chosen ruler on earth, the King. 
Forfeiture was in reality a valuable resource for the king. 
This practice among the English laid the foundation for 
civil forfeiture practices in the United States today 
(Levy, 1996; Noya, 1996). 
In Black’s law dictionary, forfeiture is defined as 
the “deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence 
of the nonperformance of some obligation or condition.” 
Forfeiture is the governmental seizure of property and 
other material goods that have been earned by way of 
criminal activity, or that have been used as part of an 
illegal action. Civil asset forfeiture is defined as the 
taking away of property by the government as a punishment 
for an illegal action (Cole and Smith, 2001). The Supreme 
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Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 
defined forfeiture as the governmental seizure of property 
that was illegally used or acquired without compensating 
the owner (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 
1974).  
A review of current literature on the topic indicates 
that civil asset forfeiture is regarded as an important 
tool that law enforcement agencies can use against drug 
dealers and traffickers. However, it is highly criticized 
for being used arbitrarily by the government as a weapon 
against innocent people. 
Methodology 
For the purposes of this research, information will be 
gathered from articles and books about the United States 
drug policy that cover asset forfeiture implementations, 
particularly civil forfeiture. Thus, during the course of 
this research, sources from the field of criminal justice 
will be used.  
In addition, law reviews, and Supreme Court cases will 
be taken into consideration. Attention will be paid to the 
footnotes of major books and articles in this field as 
well.  
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Also, qualitative data on the drug policy and the 
application of civil asset forfeiture will be drawn from 
books, government documents, articles, and law reviews that 
have been published within the last ten years. This study 
will examine the implementation of civil asset forfeiture 
in federal, state and local level law enforcement agencies 
in the United States. In this study, particular attention 
will be paid to landmark Supreme Court cases as well.  
Despite the fact that there are two types of 
forfeiture, criminal and civil, the main identifier used to 
search for documents will be civil asset forfeiture, 
especially regarding the fight against illicit drugs. This 
is mainly due to the considerable amount of attention that 
has been given to civil asset forfeiture both by 
governmental agencies who implement it and by critics who 
oppose it.  
Research used in this study will be gathered primarily 
using library catalogs and electronic resources, such as 
JSTOR, EBSCO, and the Academic Universe within the 
University of North Texas library’s database. Legal search 
engines, Lexis-Nexis, law reviews, scholarly legal 
magazines and leading Supreme Court cases within the 
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Academic Universe will be searched for information related 
to drug-related civil asset forfeiture.  
Moreover, although a considerable amount of the 
research is library-based, dependable resources from the 
World Wide Web on the Internet will also be of benefit in 
this research. Internet search engines, such as Alta Vista, 
Yahoo, and Google will be searched for keywords, including 
civil forfeiture, asset forfeiture, and civil asset 
forfeiture. Documents discovered through these search 
engines will be reviewed and non-academic sources will be 
eliminated. Screening criteria will be based on the author, 
in terms of his or her scholarly nature, and the source.    
To provide a framework for the above-mentioned 
information, the following variables will be considered: 
i. Asset forfeiture, 
ii. Drug policy, 
iii. Equitable sharing, 
iv. Probable cause, 
v. Effectiveness measurement. 
Hence, the primary keywords used will be “drug 
policy,” “narcotics,” “war on drugs,” “civil asset 
forfeiture,” “forfeiture,” “asset forfeiture and drugs,” 
“forfeiture and drugs,” “asset forfeiture fund,” 
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“effectiveness measurement,” and “civil asset forfeiture 
reform act.” Information related to criminal forfeiture 
will be cited only when it adds to the discussion of civil 
asset forfeiture. Also, the use of asset forfeiture in 
cases concerning crimes other than drugs, such as gambling, 
money laundering or fraud, will not be taken into account.   
Some essential sources of data on drug-related civil 
asset forfeiture are as follows: 
i. Governmental Sources. In the United States there are 
several formal organizations that are used to enforce 
the United States drug policy. The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) is the main organization among 
them. The Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) and its annually published Drug Control 
Strategy Reports play an important role in drug 
policy. The Asset Forfeiture Series published by the 
United States Bureau of Justice Assistance and other 
publications of the DEA, ONDCP, and National Institute 
of Justice will be used in this study. 
ii. Non-Governmental Sources. There are various 
organizations that play an important role by 
conducting research, collecting data and making 
assessments on drug-related asset forfeiture practices 
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in the United States. Thus, information from non-
governmental organizations such as Forfeiture 
Endangers American Rights (FEAR), and Drug Sense and 
its Media Awareness Project, will be utilized in this 
study in addition to other sources.  
In conclusion, this research will mainly be based on 
library and Internet sources, and will be qualitative in 
nature.  
Limitations 
There are enormous amounts of data available regarding 
asset forfeiture. However, the focus of this study is 
limited to the use of civil forfeiture in the fight against 
drugs. There are forfeiture laws concerning crimes other 
than drugs, such as gambling, money laundering and fraud. 
However, this study will be based solely on the analysis of 
civil asset forfeiture as it relates to the drugs that are 
defined as illegal by the Controlled Substance Act.  
Although the drug policy utilizes a wide range of 
professionals, including police officers as well as many 
other governmental professionals, asset forfeiture 
practices are exercised predominantly by police agencies 
and sheriff’s departments at the local level.  Because 
these two types of organizations are the ones that practice 
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civil asset forfeiture the most, this study will be limited 
to the civil asset forfeiture practices of these police 
agencies and sheriff’s departments.  
Finally, this study is restricted to sources published 
within the last ten years. This is primarily because civil 
asset forfeiture has been utilized for a long time and 
there is a massive amount of data on it. Also, a majority 
of the sources published within the last ten years include 
data on any previously adopted significant regulations.  
This study will consist of four chapters. The second 
chapter discusses the historical background of civil asset 
forfeiture and its role in the fight against drugs. The 
chapter points out that civil asset forfeiture in the fight 
against drugs have received a lot of criticism from a wide 
range of scholars. The majority of these scholars argue 
that civil forfeiture is an important financial source for 
the police rather than a useful weapon in the fight against 
drugs. 
 The third chapter will focus on the legal aspects of 
civil asset forfeiture. The primary legal considerations of 
civil forfeiture proceedings, such as the innocent owner 
defense, excessive fines clause, and double jeopardy 
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clause, are discussed in light of various landmark Supreme 
Court cases. 
 The fourth chapter of this study will be consisting of 
an in-depth analysis of civil asset forfeiture practices 
and their consequences in the United States. The equitable 
sharing provision and the misperception of civil asset 
forfeiture by law enforcement have arguably resulted in 
negative consequences. These consequences are shown in 
various studies conducted by several researchers. Chapter 
Four will also discuss solutions to the problems inherent 
in civil asset forfeiture. The use of criminal forfeiture 
instead of civil forfeiture and the elimination of the 















THE ROLE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN 
THE AMERICAN DRUG POLICY 
A Brief Look at the War on Drugs 
At its heart, the official drug policy of the United 
States attempts to accomplish two main goals. First, the 
United States drug control strategy aims to reduce the 
supply of drugs that are available on the American drug 
market. Secondly, the United States drug policy seeks to 
reduce the demand for drugs by reducing the number of drug 
users (ONDCP, 2000). In order to achieve these goals, the 
United States seeks to unite the efforts of various 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions, including 
law enforcement agencies, religious groups, community 
groups, health care professionals and educators (Schaler, 
1998). 
There are several governmental organizations involved 
in the war against drugs; these include the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and 
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Customs Service (Abadinsky, 2001). There are also various 
multi-jurisdictional task forces, such as the Organized 
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), and forty-one 
formal and twelve provisional local and state task forces 
funded by the DEA, that operate all over the United States 
(Lyman and Potter, 1998). 
The first “War on Drugs” was declared by Richard Nixon 
in 1969. Operation Intercept called for the stationing of 
numerous troops at the Mexican border in order to search 
100,000 vehicles. Operation Intercept lasted only three 
weeks, costing much more than it gained. In the 1980s, the 
Reagan Administration adopted a zero tolerance approach 
towards drugs. This approach yielded poor results (Jenkins, 
2001).  
The current war on drugs was initiated by President 
George H.W. Bush in 1990. This war aimed to end the 
activities of all known drug dealers. This plan, therefore, 
focused mainly on ending the supply of illicit drugs. For 
instance, a mobile task force was sent to the Caribbean to 
interdict a drug shipment. Napalm and defoliant were 
sprayed over the Colombian hills for this purpose (Jenkins, 
2001).  
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Bill Clinton, taking office after Bush, neither 
withdrew this fleet nor canceled its $2 billion annual 
funding allotment, due to the fear that this cancellation 
would be seen as admitting defeat. All in all, the Bush and 
Clinton programs aimed at the symptoms but not the cause. 
Efforts to reduce the demand for drugs were neglected; 
instead, supply was targeted. Enforcement simply held more 
appeal for the public. Politicians would rather have their 
pictures taken with their boots on a drug dealer’s neck 
than helping an addict during detoxification (Jenkins, 
2001).  
The efforts to reduce the number of drug users are 
considered to be a failure by many due to the fact that the 
limited benefits of prevention and treatment programs are 
outweighed by cruel, punitive policies against drug use. 
The zero-tolerance policy that was adopted in the late 
1980s to promote abstinence among drug users called for 
harsh punishments against those who were in possession of 
even very small quantities of drugs. The vehicles that drug 
users drove were often seized under forfeiture laws based 
on the fact that these vehicles were likely to be used to 
transport the user to the point of the drug sale (Bertram 
et al. 1996).  
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In fact, Miller (1996) claims that the war against 
drug users is a deliberate process of a destruction planned 
by the government. He argues that the government targets 
drug users, who are actually “a group of regular people” 
for destruction, through the process of identification, 
ostracism, confiscation, concentration, and annihilation. 
Each element constitutes a link in the chain of 
destruction. This process, Miller claims, is comparable to 
the destruction process that was perpetrated by Nazi 
Germany against the Jewish people. He alleges that drug 
users are targets that the United States government 
deliberately intends to eliminate (Miller, 1996).  
On the other hand, critics argue that public policy 
regarding the fight against illicit drugs is based on the 
selfishness of bureaucrats and concerns about the community 
budget. Bureaucrats who “advertise” their participation in 
the drug control strategy are often able to gain the public 
support needed to win elections and thus formulate their 
own drug policies. These bureaucrats gain funding for their 
programs, sometimes at the expense of public education or 
welfare programs. They have to compete for their share of 
local, state and federal funds; they also compete with 
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other law enforcement bureaucracies for funding (Benson and 
Rasmussen, 1996). 
Thus, it is important for them to show taxpayers and 
other interested parties that law enforcement successfully 
does its job. Because the amount of crime that is prevented 
cannot be measured, other more measurable factors must be 
used to ascertain the effectiveness of law enforcement 
efforts. The number of arrests, cost of seized drugs, and 
asset seizure totals all play an important role in this 
regard (Benson and Rasmussen, 1996). 
Despite the efforts of the war on drugs to increase 
drug prices on the black market and thereby decrease the 
number of drug users, there have been few fluctuations in 
the prices of illicit drugs, and drug users have remained 
unquenchable. The drug abuse problem still continues and 
the war on drugs is already considered to have failed by 
many observers (Miller and Selva, 1994; Holden-Rhodes, 
1997; Istralowitz and Telias, 1998; Jordan, 1999). The 
American people are not informed about the facts regarding 
the war on drugs, although most of them have in one way or 
another, become victims of drugs (Holden-Rhodes, 1997).  
The war on drugs is considered to have failed despite 
the use of harsher sentences, such as mandatory minimums 
 23 
and asset forfeiture laws. Drug traffickers have avoided 
forfeiture by using other individuals’ assets, through 
money laundering or the use of rental facilities. Mandatory 
minimums have resulted in an increased number of Americans 
behind bars, creating significant prison overcrowding 
problems for most of the states (Benson and Rasmussen, 
1996; Currie, 1998). 
Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture in the Fight Against Drugs  
The origins of forfeiture are related to “deodand,” a 
word derived from the Latin, “deo dandum” meaning “given to 
God.” Deodand meant that any object that was the subject of 
forfeiture to God, was in fact subject to the English 
crown. Forfeiture was a valuable source of income for the 
king. It was subsequently passed along to the United 
States, serving as basis for its civil forfeiture 
practices. Objects rather than individuals were sued by the 
government sometimes under funny names, such as the United 
States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two Door, in 
which an automobile was sued. The proceeding was regarded 
as a civil proceeding, and was viewed as a remedial action 
rather than a punishment (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co. 1974; Levy, 1996).  
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Thus, the history of asset forfeiture goes back to the 
ancient English common law of the 1700s, in which vessels 
were seized due to their owners’ failure to pay customs 
taxes. And, as mentioned above, colonial America was 
introduced to asset forfeiture because of the fact that the 
British Crown was the principal beneficiary of colonial 
America at that time. The American legal system was 
subsequently based on English common law (Reed, 1992; 
Burnham, 1996; Eldredge, 1998).  
In the beginning, civil forfeiture was not related to 
drug crimes. The only condition for a property’s forfeiture 
was that it was either illegal, an illegal contraband, or 
it was used while committing a crime. For example, pirate 
ships that were used to smuggle contraband would be 
forfeited. Civil forfeiture was later utilized in the Civil 
War, and it was regarded as an important weapon against the 
Confederacy. People who supported the Confederacy were 
deprived of all of their property (Miller, 1996), and 
consequently the United States government was provided with 
a considerable amount of income (Noya, 1996).  
The civil forfeiture of any kind of proceeds that 
originated from drug trafficking was authorized by Congress 
in 1978. This authorization gave prosecutors an effective 
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civil instrument that would enable them to seize the 
proceeds of drug trafficking (Goldsmith, 1992; Schmalleger, 
2001). 
In spite of the existence of hundreds of laws 
regarding civil asset forfeiture, the Racketeer-Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Continuing 
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute made the practice of 
forfeiture the most fundamental aspect of the war on drugs. 
RICO was introduced as an important safeguard in the fight 
against organized crime, while CCE was also known as the 
“kingpin” law as a result of the fact that it was intended 
to target major drug traffickers (Miller, 1996).  
However, asset forfeiture was not common before the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) created a Model 
Forfeiture of Drug Profits Act, and encouraged state law 
enforcers to utilize asset forfeiture practices through its 
“Drug Agents’ Guide to Forfeiture of Assets” handbook in 
1982. Moreover, the Anti-Drug Abuse Bill of 1988 provided 
much harsher penalties for the violation of drug laws. It 
also gave many more resources to law enforcement agencies, 
and established the Asset Forfeiture Fund (Miller and 
Selva, 1994; Noya, 1996).  
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The practice of federal forfeiture today is considered 
to be one of the most efficient legal instruments in the 
fight against illicit drugs by the law enforcement 
agencies. This practice is the primary weapon used to 
interfere with drug related activity. It is more efficient 
than the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) and The Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute 
(Lyman & Potter, 1998).  
There are two types of asset forfeiture that are 
permitted by federal narcotics laws: criminal asset 
forfeiture and civil asset forfeiture. In the case of civil 
asset forfeiture, the property that is sought after is the 
direct target of the proceedings. This is due to historical 
precedents that consider the property itself to be guilty 
of illegal behavior (Goldsmith and Lenck, 1992).  
Criminal forfeiture was introduced with the enactment 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO). Criminal asset forfeiture is different than civil 
forfeiture because it targets the individual criminals, not 
the assets (Reed, 1992). Also, criminal forfeiture requires 
the conviction of a crime, and the government has to follow 
due process assurances in criminal trials. In civil 
forfeiture cases, however, probable cause is enough, and 
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the government does not have to prove a crime. Rather, it 
is the property owner’s responsibility to refute the 
accusation (Miller 1996; Warchol, Payne, and Johnson, 1999; 
Larson, 2000). Criminal forfeiture is considered to have 
yielded ineffective results, mostly because law enforcement 
agencies were not allowed to seize the assets during trial 
proceedings (Barnet, 2001; Levy, 1996).  
Thus, the term forfeiture has come primarily to mean 
civil forfeiture by the Drug Enforcement Administration, in 
cases where there is not a statute necessitating a criminal 
prosecution. In addition, the swift, less costly and more 
productive characteristics of civil forfeiture “in rem” 
actions make it more popular than criminal forfeiture 
(Levy, 1996). The federal government tends to follow the 
money. It targets the financial foundation of illegal drug 
trafficking networks, and their subsequent money laundering 
activities, using asset forfeiture to seize the fruits of 
illegal ventures (ONDCP, 2000). 
There are, for the most part, three types of materials 
that can be forfeited: contraband, proceeds, property or 
instrumentalities. The term contraband refers to items that 
are illegally obtained. Proceeds are materials that are 
earned through illegal actions. The term proceeds is open 
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to discussion, but can be defined as “that which is 
received in exchange when an object is sold, traded, or 
disposed of otherwise” (Fann, Gordon, and Leach, 1993:5). 
For example, any property that is bought with money 
obtained from illicit drug trafficking becomes the proceeds 
of the exchange. “Property” refers specifically to property 
that is used in the course of an illegal act. In fact, 
property can be subject to forfeiture if there is simply an 
intention to use it in a prohibited act (Fann et al. 1993; 
Watterson, 1997). 
Although there are not many criticisms about the 
seizures of contraband or proceeds, the forfeiture of 
instrumentalities has been somewhat controversial in 
forfeiture history. This is mainly because of the 
personification that considers the property itself guilty 
of wrongdoing. This enables the government to take legal 
action against the property with no notice. What is more, 
it is the owner’s responsibility to prove that the property 
is not guilty. Furthermore, the forfeiture of 
instrumentalities has been the subject of criticism because 
it altered the attitude of law enforcement agencies towards 
crime prevention. It has been argued that law enforcement 
targets the assets rather than the criminals. Finally, 
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criticisms were raised over the degree of 
disproportionality between the offenses and the assets 
confiscated (Watterson, 1997). These concepts will be 
discussed further in Chapter Four. 
Forfeiture laws permit three different types of civil 
forfeiture and asset seizure. Summary forfeiture, 
administrative forfeiture, which can also be considered 
under the heading of non-judicial civil forfeiture, and 
civil-judicial forfeiture (Warchol et al. 1999).  
Summary forfeiture applies to illegal properties that 
are described as contraband. Administrative forfeiture 
allows for the seizure of properties that cannot be 
imported, financial mechanisms, means that are used for 
shipping, storing, or importing illegal materials, and all 
of the assets with a value of at least $500,000. 
Administrative forfeiture is considered to be a competent, 
rapid, and cost-effective approach (Warchol et al. 1999).  
Civil-judicial forfeiture provides the noteworthy 
consequence of putting the burden of proof on the defendant 
rather than the government. This strategy initially 
developed when drug traffickers were considered to be 
foreign nationals who live outside America. In their case, 
the requirement of a conviction to initiate forfeiture 
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would be inappropriate because they could keep themselves 
out of the United States borders. Hence, civil forfeiture 
that does not require a criminal charge in order to 
initiate asset forfeiture has become a significant and 
rather controversial policy (Warchol et al. 1999).   
In addition, one of the foremost advantages of civil 
forfeiture is that law enforcement officials do not need 
more than probable cause to initiate the forfeiture 
process. Moreover, it is the claimant’s responsibility to 
fight to recover the forfeiture (Goldsmith, 1992; Friedman, 
1999). Circumstantial evidence is enough to start the 
forfeiture process in narcotics trafficking cases, where it 
would be unusual to gather direct evidence (Goldsmith, 
1992; Noya, 1996).  
Some common elements of circumstantial evidence 
include close proximity, spending extensive hard cash, cash 
hordes, and attempts to conceal the factual possession of 
assets. Close proximity refers to the location of the 
assets and closeness of drugs seized, and is considered to 
be an important indication of drug trafficking (Goldsmith, 
1992). 
In other words, this type of forfeiture considers the 
proximity between assets and drugs. Spending extensive hard 
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cash and the failure to give a reasonable explanation for 
income are also types of circumstantial evidence that are 
indicative of drug trafficking. Evidence that consists of 
various combinations of these factors, depending on the 
details of the case, further ensures that targeted assets 
represent narcotics profits (Goldsmith, 1992). 
Conclusion 
The underlying principle in civil asset forfeiture is 
that the property itself is regarded as guilty, rather than 
the owner. In other words, property that is subject to 
forfeiture can be considered “guilty” itself depending on 
its direct involvement in a crime, or even its use in the 
course of committing a crime. Civil forfeiture may exist 
even if there is not a criminal action. Particularly, the 
forfeiture of the real property of criminals may well 
result in the removal of their assets, and the deterrence 
of similar criminal actions, all the while establishing a 
lucrative source of income for law enforcement agencies 
(Aylesworth, 1991).  
Supporters of civil forfeiture laws assert that 
criminal organizations continue to undertake their illegal 
activities even if their key members or leaders are 
convicted or put in prison except in cases where their 
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economic base is targeted. The act of seizing the assets 
derived from criminal enterprise is intended to dismantle 
the economic infrastructure of various drug trafficking and 
otherwise criminal networks (DEA, 2001; Janzen, 1990; Reed, 
1992). This is primarily because even if the principal, 
command level people in an illicit drug trafficking 
organization are incarcerated, there will be other people 
who will replace them and continue their illegal activities 
unless the financial assets are removed from the 
organization (Aylesworth, 1991).  
A business without a financial base will most likely 
fail. For this reason, the federal government targets the 
financial foundation of illegal drug trafficking networks 
and money laundering rings through the use of asset 
forfeiture (ONDCP, 2000). Forfeiture laws are considered to 
be among the most powerful tools available to deprive drug 
trafficking organizations of the resources they need to 
continue their illegal activities (DEA, 2001; Warchol et 
al. 1999). Also, they have an important role in decreasing 
recidivism and reducing crime (Hartman, 2001). 
On the other hand, there are criticisms over the 
practice of civil forfeiture. The United States 
Constitution provides protection against unfair searches 
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and seizures within the Fourth Amendment. Depending on the 
circumstances, the police are required to have either 
probable cause or a warrant in order to initiate a search 
to gather evidence that may pertain to a crime that they 
believe has been committed (Swanson, et al. 2001; Weinreb, 
2001). In practice however, forfeiture laws have been 
criticized for violating the constitutional rights of the 
people because police can seize a person’s property without 
a warrant, based solely on probable cause. This practice 
leaves the person whose property has been seized with the 
responsibility of proving that he or she is innocent in 
order to recover the property (Bertram, et al. 1996; 
Eldredge, 1998; Jensen and Gerber, 1996; Friedman, 1999).  
Furthermore, this person must prove that he or she did not 
intend to commit a crime due to the fact that asset 
forfeiture is permitted even in cases where nothing more 
than an intention to commit crime exists (Aylesworth, 1991; 
Lynch, 2000). 
Therefore, although civil asset forfeiture is regarded 
as an important tool in the fight against illicit drugs, 
and even though its primary targets are major drug 
traffickers and drug kingpins, in practice, police agencies 
have shown a tendency to choose easy targets, such as 
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wealthy drug users or people who have more assets (Bauman, 
1995). 
In conclusion, this chapter points out that the United 
States drug policy and civil asset forfeiture in the fight 
against drugs have received a lot of criticism from a wide 
range of scholars. The majority of these scholars consider 
the United States drug policy to be an unsuccessful policy. 
They argue that civil forfeiture is an important financial 
source for the police rather than a useful weapon in the 
fight against drugs.  
Criticism over civil asset forfeiture is not limited 
simply to what is mentioned in this chapter. Civil asset 
forfeiture practices have been challenged based on several 
legal issues, such as the use of excessive fines, double 














One of the foremost advantages of civil forfeiture is 
that law enforcement officials do not need more than 
probable cause to initiate the forfeiture process 
(Goldsmith, 1992; Blacher, 1994; Jensen and Gerber, 1996). 
Most of the time, probable cause is enough to initiate the 
forfeiture process without a warrant. Criminal forfeiture 
requires the conviction of a crime, and the government has 
to follow due process assurances in criminal trials. In 
civil forfeiture, however, probable cause is enough, and 
the government does not have to prove its case. Rather, it 
is the property owner’s responsibility to refute the 
accusation (Miller, 1996; Jensen and Gerber, 1996; 
Friedman, 1999).  
This is particularly important because of the nature 
of the illegal drug trade. The illegal drug trade is 
considered to be difficult to detect because it involves 
consensual crimes. The people who get involved in drug-
related activities, whether as sellers or buyers, are 
involved voluntarily. Thus, in most cases, there are not 
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any victims to complain about the illegal acts. 
Consequently, law enforcement officers have to depend on 
probable cause or exercise more intrusive techniques that 
are likely to violate the due process rights of the 
individuals (Jensen and Gerber, 1998). 
Primary Considerations: The Excessive Fines, Double 
Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses 
Consequently, there has been much criticism directed 
towards the practice of civil asset forfeiture. Civil asset 
forfeiture proceedings have been challenged particularly on 
the basis of the Excessive Fines, Double Jeopardy, and Due 
Process Clauses (Johnson, 2000).  
The underlying concept behind the excessive fines 
clause is the principle of gross disproportionality 
established by the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v Bajakajian in 1998. The severity of the forfeiture 
proceeding should be proportional to the offense committed 
by the owner of the seized property. In order to have a 
violation of the excessive fines clause, the claimant must 
establish gross disproportionality by proving that the fine 
is unusual, grossly excessive, and not proportionate to his 
or her offense (United States v Bajakajian 1998; Warchol et 
al. 1999). 
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The double jeopardy clause assures that a person 
cannot be prosecuted twice for the same crime. The Fifth 
Amendment bars multiple prosecutions or punishments for the 
same crime by the same sovereign (Inciardi, 1999; 
Whitebread and Slobogin, 2000).  
In United States criminal justice history, opinions 
about the double jeopardy clause have varied depending on 
which justices of the United States Supreme Court were in 
charge. Civil forfeiture proceedings were sometimes 
considered to be remedial rather than punitive, and did not 
then constitute double jeopardy (Watterson, 1997). Some 
years later however, civil forfeiture proceedings were 
regarded as punitive, consequently they did constitute 
double jeopardy in a later United States Supreme Court 
decision (United States v. Halper 1989; Watterson, 1997). 
In another landmark case, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled once again that civil forfeiture proceedings were 
considered to be remedial rather than punitive and do not 
constitute double jeopardy (United States v. Ursery 1996; 
Watterson, 1997). This, the most recent ruling of the Court 
on this matter, still holds true today. 
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The Due Process model of the criminal justice system 
focuses on the elimination of error and the possibility of 
error in the criminal justice system. Of primary 
consideration are the potential consequences if there were 
a mistake. This model relies on the courts as the primary 
mechanism to identify errors. Legal guilt is as important 
as factual guilt. The system asserts that the legal process 
must thoroughly be followed (Whitebread and Slobogin, 
2000). 
Doctrines of Civil Asset Forfeiture 
 There are also various doctrines that pertain to civil 
forfeiture. These include the taint doctrine, the 
personification fiction, the innocent-owner defense, and 
the relation-back doctrine (Reed, 1992). 
The taint doctrine states that the illegal use of an 
object “taints” it and therefore makes it subject to 
forfeiture (Reed, 1992). The taint-doctrine is also one of 
the controversial aspects of asset forfeiture in terms of 
its arbitrary use by police agencies. Police can seize cash 
money claiming that their dogs sniff out cash money as 
drug-tainted (Schneider and Flaherty, 1991). The lesser 
requirement of probable cause has resulted in numerous 
claims of due process violations by law enforcement 
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agencies. For example, with a simple probable cause 
requirement, the police have the authority to arrest the 
owner of a food store and seize his earnings just because 
they find a couple of dollar bills with a cocaine scent on 
them (Vallance, 1993). 
A study was made on cocaine-tainted money in Dallas, 
Austin, Miami, New York City, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, 
Pittsburgh, Syracuse, Memphis, and Seattle. The study that 
lasted seven years showed that almost all of the bills with 
an average of ninety-six percent, tested positive for 
cocaine. Thus, it is easy for bills to become tainted with 
cocaine and for the dogs to point out those bills, even if 
the person who currently possesses them has nothing to do 
with drugs (Schneider and Flaherty, 1991). In addition, 
cocaine-tainted bills cannot be considered to be evidence 
that the current holder had actual direct contact with 
drugs. Moreover, the bills that are seized by police in 
drug busts are not always destroyed. They are usually put 
back into circulation through local banks (Schneider and 
Flaherty, 1991). 
 Thus, the use of canine units to detect drug-tainted 
cash money has been challenged by the fact that more than 
90% of all bills are tainted by cocaine. Lab tests run on 
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money to detect cocaine yield positive results due to the 
rapid and extensive circulation of cash bills (Levy, 1996). 
 The relation-back doctrine is associated with the 
taint doctrine. The relation back doctrine makes it 
possible for the government to seize property today that 
was tainted in the past, even if the owner has changed over 
time. The relation back doctrine is an important tool for 
drug enforcement officers, one that enables them to 
confiscate the goods of unknowing property owners. For 
example, an apartment building can be seized from its 
current owner, even though drugs were being dealt out of 
the building more than four years ago under a different 
owner (Reed, 1992; Levy, 1996; Miller, 1996). 
Personification fiction considers the property itself 
to be legally responsible for the illegal act, regardless 
of its owner’s innocence (Reed, 1992; Barnet, 2001). Thus, 
the property of people who are not involved in illicit drug 
trafficking can be seized according to the laws. This is 
because in a civil forfeiture proceeding, the assumption is 
made that the property itself is guilty of an unlawful 
activity (Goldsmith and Lenck, 1992). For example, in the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in 1974 in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, a rented yacht was 
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seized because of a marijuana cigarette, which was found on 
the yacht (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company 
1974).  
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, the 
person who rented the yacht out was neither involved in the 
criminal act that was committed, nor was he even aware of 
the yacht’s illegal use. The case took place in Puerto 
Rico. The Court held that under Puerto Rican Statutes, he 
was not deprived of his property rights without just 
compensation. This was simply because the owner of the 
vessel voluntarily assigned the renters temporary 
possession of the vessel (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Company 1974). 
Furthermore, the owner could not provide any evidence 
proving that he made reasonable efforts to prevent the 
illegal use of his property. This decision raised two 
constitutional concerns: first, that the seizure took place 
without prior notice, second, that the property of an 
innocent party was seized without providing fair 
compensation. The rationale was that the property itself 
was guilty of wrongdoing (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Company 1974). 
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In another striking example, a Hawaiian couple had a 
terrible experience with civil asset forfeiture as a result 
of their mentally ill son’s marijuana use. Their son was 
undergoing therapy and threatened them with suicide if they 
would not let him use marijuana, so they did. He was 
subsequently sentenced to probation following his guilty 
plea for growing marijuana in 1987. However, four years 
after the incident, the police rediscovered the case in 
their files and initiated proceedings for possibilities for 
the forfeiture of the house. The parents knew that 
marijuana was being grown in their house. They were not 
regarded as innocent owners and received no sympathy. 
Consequently, their house was forfeited (Schneider and 
Flaherty, 1991; Trebach and Inciardi, 1993; Miller, 1996).  
The United States Constitution provides protection 
against unfair searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment. With a very few specific exceptions, police are 
required to obtain a judicial order in the form of a 
warrant in order to initiate a search to gather evidence 
with respect to a crime that they believe has been 
committed (Swanson, et al. 2001; Weinreb, 2001). Forfeiture 
laws threaten to undermine the constitutional rights of 
citizens. They allow police to seize a person’s property 
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without a warrant, with only a suspicion based on probable 
cause. This leaves the individual citizen with the 
responsibility of proving that he or she is innocent in 
order to recover the property (Bertram et al. 1996; Miller, 
1996; Eldredge, 1998; Reed, 1992). This holds true even in 
cases where no crime has been committed but it is believed 
that there was the intention to commit a crime (Lynch, 
2000; Jensen and Gerber, 1998).  
Civil forfeiture is an important tool in the war on 
drugs, one that takes away the property of drug users. 
Unfortunately, it also takes away the property of innocent 
people. Law enforcers take advantage of the lesser probable 
cause requirement of asset forfeiture cases and leave the 
burden of proof to the civilians. The owners of seized 
property are required to prove that not only were they 
unaware that their property was being illegally used by the 
drug offender, but also that the offender gained custody of 
their property by way of an illegal act (Reed, 1992; 
Miller, 1996). This is called the innocent owner defense. 
Contrary to the fundamental principles of the American 
judicial process, the owner is assumed to be guilty and 
must prove otherwise in order to regain possession of his 
own property (Reed, 1992).  
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Major United States Supreme Court Cases 
The Unites States Supreme Court finally paid attention 
to the growing claims that civil forfeiture posed problems 
in regards to the excessive fines, double jeopardy, and due 
process clauses. The Court made significant rulings 
regarding these concepts as they relate to civil asset 
forfeiture practices (Eldredge, 1998).  
Double Jeopardy was considered to apply strictly to 
criminal proceedings before the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in 1989. Civil proceedings were considered 
to be “in rem” proceedings, that is, proceedings brought 
against property that did not impose punishment on any 
actual person. The United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Halper, in 1989, however, held that civil 
forfeiture proceedings should not be considered remedial. 
Rather, they potentially violate the double jeopardy 
clause. The Halper case involved the submission of a 
considerable number of fake claims under the Medicare 
program in order to receive compensation from the 
government. The respondent was subject to a civil 
forfeiture action totaling over $130,000 following his 
conviction. The Supreme Court focused their attention on 
the civil asset forfeiture proceedings. Do these 
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proceedings, as an addition to the criminal proceedings, 
constitute double jeopardy? Also, the Court was interested 
in the proportionality of the offense to the punishment 
imposed upon the defendant (United States v. Halper 1989; 
Watterson, 1997). 
The Court decided that the civil versus criminal 
nature of the proceedings was not their main concern when 
considering the question of double jeopardy. The amount of 
the respondent’s money that was subject to forfeiture was 
grossly disproportionate to the loss of the government. 
Therefore, the Court held that civil proceedings that 
impose disproportionate sanctions go beyond restitution. 
They constitute punishment and as such they violate the 
double jeopardy clause. This was the first time that the 
United States Supreme Court characterized civil forfeiture 
as potentially a punishment rather than a remedy, one that 
could violate the double jeopardy clause (United States v. 
Halper 1989; Watterson, 1997). 
 Another important decision in favor of the property 
owners was made by the Supreme Court a couple of years 
later in 1993. In United States v. A Parcel of Land, which 
is also known as “92 Buena Vista Avenue”, a woman’s house 
was subject to forfeiture by the government. The forfeiture 
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action was based on the fact that there was probable cause 
to believe that the money used to buy the house was derived 
from illicit drug trafficking. The owner of the house 
claimed that she was unaware of the origins of the money; 
it was given to her as a gift. Thus, she claimed that she 
should be considered to be an innocent owner. The United 
States Supreme Court ruled that a property could not be 
seized by the government based on taint-doctrine if the 
owner did not know of his or her property’s relation with 
drugs in the past (Heching, 1993; United States v. A Parcel 
of Land 1993; Eldredge, 1998). 
After the United States v. A Parcel of Land decision, 
the burden of proof shifted at least partially to the 
government. It was now the responsibility of the government 
to prove that the owner knew about the unlawful 
relationship between his or her property and the illegal 
act. Only when the government could prove this knowledge 
could it initiate civil asset forfeiture proceedings based 
on the taint-doctrine (United States v. A Parcel of Land 
1993; Reed, 1992).  
 Civil asset forfeiture proceedings involve 
disproportionality in terms of crime and punishment 
(Schneider and Flaherty, 1991; Trebach and Inciardi, 1993; 
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Miller, 1996). Another landmark case addressed the question 
of proportionality, using the test established in Halper to 
decide whether civil proceedings could be construed as 
punitive (Watterson, 1997). In Austin v. United States in 
1993, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment was applicable both to civil and criminal 
forfeiture. In Austin, the petitioner was arrested for 
possession of illegal drugs. The government brought a civil 
forfeiture action against the petitioner’s auto shop and 
mobile home, properties that were considered to be 
instrumental to the crime. The government claimed that they 
either were utilized or were intended to be utilized in the 
illegal drug trade (Austin v. United States 1993; Brodey, 
1997).  
 The Court wanted to clarify whether forfeiture imposed 
a punishment. The Court could then decide whether the 
forfeiture of the petitioner’s auto shop and mobile home 
should be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause limiting 
financial punishment. The Court held that, historically and 
presently, civil forfeiture is regarded as a legal tool 
that is intended to both deter and punish. Thus, it is 
subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment (Austin v. United States 1993; Watterson, 1997). 
 48 
 Consequently, the Court stressed that the rationale 
for the decision in Austin was that the remedial interest 
of the government was the seizure of contraband, whereas 
the mobile home and the auto-body shop in Austin were not 
contraband. The decision required that the amount of the 
property or cash should be proportional to the crime, 
otherwise it would be considered to be an excessive penalty 
(Austin v. United States 1993; Watterson, 1997).  
 Another important decision was made in United States 
v. James Daniel Good Real Property, also in 1993. In this 
case, the government seized the individual’s property 
despite the fact that he had completed his sentence for the 
violation of drug laws four years ago. What is more, the 
individual was given no prior notice, nor was he subject to 
a legal action (United States v. Real Property 1993; 
Eldredge, 1998). 
In its decision, the Court held that due process 
required prior notice and an opportunity for a trial should 
be given to individuals before they are deprived of 
property. The only exception to this would be in cases with 
exigent circumstances (United States v. Real Property 1993; 
Eldredge, 1998).  
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Six months later, the United States Supreme Court made 
an important ruling in a case that involved the 
government’s attempt to apply taxes to the seized and 
subsequently destroyed drugs (Department of Revenue of 
Montana, Petitioner v. Kurth Ranch 1994; Watterson, 1997). 
In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch in 1994, 
the marijuana farm of the Kurth family was discovered by 
law enforcement, and the drugs were subsequently destroyed. 
Following a criminal proceeding, a civil proceeding 
imposing taxes on the destroyed drugs was initiated by the 
government as well (Watterson, 1997). 
In this case, the Court issued a reminder that civil 
forfeiture is an extremely important tool for law 
enforcement. It can be used effectively to deter crime, 
generate revenue for the government, and levy a financial 
burden on defendants. However, the government may not 
impose an additional civil penalty on a defendant in a 
separate proceeding (Department of Revenue of Montana, 
Petitioner v. Kurth Ranch 1994).  
Therefore, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that 
if the tax imposed by the government served any punitive 
goals, it would be subject to the limits of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. The Court held that the application of the 
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drug tax following a conviction violated the double 
jeopardy clause under the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
stressed that the tax was not imposed on a property as it 
was intended to be, but it was levied on drugs that had 
been destroyed and were consequently no longer owned by the 
individual. Thus, the tax levied by Montana was not 
regarded as a remedial act. Rather, it was seen as an 
additional punishment (Department of Revenue of Montana, 
Petitioner v. Kurth Ranch 1994; Watterson, 1997). 
 In Bennis v. Michigan in 1996, however, the innocent 
owner defense was rejected by the Court. In this case, a 
jointly-owned automobile was subject to forfeiture because 
of its use in an illegal action by the husband, even though 
his spouse was unaware of the illegal act. The Court held 
that the innocent owner’s due process rights were not 
violated. The Court made the justification on the grounds 
that the property itself was guilty and the half-owner of 
the property could be held accountable for the other 
party’s illegal behavior on the ground that she entrusted 
her property to him. However, this decision was criticized 
as being unfair. It was argued that the Court should have 
applied the excessive fines clause analysis that was 
decided in Austin v. United States in 1993. In Austin, the 
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Court had held that forfeiture under the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment was applicable to both civil 
and criminal forfeiture. The rationale was that the 
remedial interest of the government was simply the seizure 
of the contraband, whereas the mobile home and the auto-
body shop in Austin were not contraband (Austin v. United 
States 1993; Bennis v. Michigan 1996; Baur, 1996; 
Schroeder, 1996; Brodey, 1997).  
In the same year the United States Supreme Court made 
another striking decision regarding the nature of civil 
asset forfeiture. In a landmark case, United States v. 
Ursery in 1996, it was held that civil forfeiture 
proceedings should be considered remedial rather than 
punitive, and they do not constitute double jeopardy. It 
was stated that even though forfeiture proceedings have 
some punitive characteristics, they have primarily 
remedial, non-punitive objectives (United States v. Ursery 
1996; Schroeder, 1996; Watterson, 1997). 
Ursery involved the seizure of marijuana on the 
respondent’s property, the subsequent conviction of the 
respondent, and the civil asset forfeiture proceedings 
undertaken against the property. Civil forfeiture 
proceedings were brought against the property on the 
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grounds that the house had been involved in the illegal 
drug business due to its use by the respondent. The lower 
courts held that civil forfeiture was a punishment, and 
therefore constituted double jeopardy, based on the 
decisions made in Kurth Ranch, Austin, and Halper (United 
States v. Ursery 1996). 
The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with the 
decisions of the lower courts, and it reversed the case. 
The Court had held in Austin by referring to Halper that 
civil asset forfeiture would be examined within the scope 
of double jeopardy as long as it had punitive nature. 
Despite this fact, the Court refused to broaden the 
standard established in Halper and Austin to the civil 
asset forfeiture proceedings in Ursery (Watterson, 1997). 
Furthermore, in Kurth Ranch, the dichotomy of criminal 
and civil forfeiture was considered not to be of importance 
in terms of their punitive nature. It was held in Kurth 
Ranch that labeling a proceeding as civil, rather than 
criminal, would not prevent it from having punitive rather 
than remedial characteristics. The Court, ironically, cited 
the extreme differences between criminal and civil 
proceedings only two years after Kurth Ranch in Ursery 
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(Department of Revenue of Montana, Petitioner v. Kurth 
Ranch 1994; Watterson, 1997).  
The Court used a two-part test, one that was 
established in 89 Firearms in 1984, to decide the case. The 
first issue was to determine the intentions of Congress 
regarding the forfeiture proceedings. Were they punitive or 
remedial? The Court stated that the intentions of Congress 
were remedial. Civil forfeiture actions were considered to 
be civil actions by Congress, and they therefore had 
remedial characteristics. The Court also stated that 
historically and traditionally acts in rem were regarded as 
civil proceedings (United States v. Ursery 1996; Brand, 
1996; Schroeder, 1996; Watterson, 1997). 
In addition, civil proceedings have remedial goals. 
They seek to deter the illegal firearms trade and to remove 
firearms that were illegally used or were intended to be 
illegally used from circulation.  In the second part of its 
test, the Court identified whether civil forfeiture 
constituted an added penalty in fact, regardless of 
Congress’ intention. It was held that civil forfeiture was 
truly remedial rather than punitive, and it was a separate 
proceeding. The Court also maintained that the requirement 
of the forfeiture of assets be used in drug trafficking 
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would help ensure that property owners would not let their 
assets be used in crime (United States v. Ursery 1996; 
Brand, 1996; Schroeder, 1996; Watterson, 1997).  
  The latest landmark case regarding excessive fines 
involved the violation of the requirement to report large 
amounts of money before leaving the United States. In 
United States v Bajakajian in 1998, the respondent was 
leaving the country and failed to report the large amount 
of cash that he was taking with him. The money was 
discovered by the Customs agents. Congressional legislation 
mandated that the respondent forfeit the entire amount as 
punishment (United States v Bajakajian 1998; Johnson, 
2000). 
 This case was considered to be a criminal forfeiture, 
rather than a civil forfeiture because there was a crime 
committed. Thus, the forfeiture of the money was a fine 
imposed upon the respondent. Consequently, the Supreme 
Court held that the forfeiture was considered a fine under 
the Eighth Amendment, and the underlying concept of an 
excessive fine was gross disproportionality. Thus, 
forfeiture of the large amount of money was grossly 
disproportionate to a reporting violation (United States v 
Bajakajian 1998; Johnson, 2000). 
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Conclusion 
 After many various decisions were handed down by the 
United States Supreme Court regarding civil forfeiture, the 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 was enacted by 
Congress in an attempt to resolve some of the problems 
related to civil forfeiture practices (Dunn 2000; Barnet 
2001). Unfortunately, there is no provision that regulates 
the highly criticized equitable sharing provision, and the 
Act was not incorporated into State legislations, which 
means it is not binding on the States (Ross, 2000; Worrall, 
2001). In addition, the law expands the civil forfeiture 
authority of law enforcement. The proceeds derived from any 
specifically defined illegal activity may legally be 
forfeited (Cassella, 2001).  
 On the other hand, the Act required clear evidence 
that shows that property is subject to forfeiture before 
the government can take action against it. In other words, 
the new law requires stronger evidence than probable cause, 
and it shifts the burden of proof from the innocent 
property owners to the federal government (Dunn, 2000; 
Cassella, 2001). The forfeiture of real property as it was 
held in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property in 
1993 is codified in the new Act. The statute requires that, 
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except in cases with exigent circumstances, the government 
should provide notice prior to seizure and an opportunity 
for a trial (United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property 1993; Cassella, 2001).  
 The Act allows for a joint innocent owner defense and 
the appointment of legal counsel for the people who cannot 
afford it in cases at the federal level (Ross, 2000; 
Barnet, 2001; Cassella, 2001; Worrall, 2001). It also 
allows the owner of the property to sue the government if 
the property is damaged while in the government’s 
possession. The Act also gives the judge the opportunity to 
discharge the property, should the seizure present a 
substantial hardship to the owner. The use of criminal 
forfeiture in lieu of civil forfeiture, when possible, is 
also encouraged by the Act (H.R. 1658, 2000; Barnet, 2001). 
 Civil asset forfeiture practices have been heavily 
challenged over the excessive fines, double jeopardy, and 
due process clauses. Civil forfeiture proceedings were 
sometimes considered to be remedial rather than punitive, 
and sometimes they were regarded as punitive by the United 
States Supreme Court. Thus, depending on the ruling, they 
either did, or did not constitute double jeopardy. 
Currently they are considered to be remedial rather than 
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punitive and do not constitute double jeopardy (United 
States v. Halper 1989; United States v. Ursery 1996; 
Watterson, 1997). 
Civil forfeiture is an important tool in the war on 
drugs, and law enforcers take the advantage of the lesser 
probable cause requirement of asset forfeiture cases (Reed 
1992; Miller 1996). The new law that requires stronger 
evidence than probable cause is believed to shift the 
burden of proof from the innocent property owners to the 


















THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN  
THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS 
Analysis of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Tool in the Fight 
Against Drugs 
In spite of the existence of hundreds of laws 
regarding civil asset forfeiture, RICO and CCE have made 
the forfeiture practice the most fundamental aspect of the 
war on drugs. RICO has proven to be an important safeguard 
in the fight against organized crime, while CCE has become 
known as the “kingpin” law as a result of its effectiveness 
in efforts to bring down major drug traffickers (Miller, 
1996). However, it has been argued that forfeiture laws 
have changed the attitudes that law enforcement agencies 
have had towards the drug war by creating the financial 
incentive to pursue drug traffickers. As a result of the 
amendments that were added to several criminal and civil 
codes, the main emphasis of law enforcement organizations 
were diverted from drug “bosses” to less important drug 
users, landowners, and petty dealers (Trebach and Inciardi, 
1993).  
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Despite the fact that the theory behind asset 
forfeiture targets major drug traffickers and drug 
kingpins, in practice, police agencies tend to choose easy 
targets, focusing on wealthy drug users or people who have 
more assets (Bauman, 1995). The assets are targeted rather 
than the drug traffickers, and forfeiture laws are 
considered to be profitable by law enforcement agencies. In 
many cases, massive amounts of assets are seized in cases 
where there were relatively small quantities of drugs. For 
example, in the Colero-Toledo case, a house, a vehicle, a 
farm, and even a vessel were seized when police found a 
tiny amount of marijuana (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co. 1974; Miller, 1996).  
Civil asset forfeiture came to be used as it is today 
for several reasons. First, there is currently no need for 
a criminal charge in order to begin forfeiture. This policy 
assumes that legal action is taken against the property not 
the person. It is that person’s responsibility to take 
legal action against the government to get back the 
property (Trebach and Inciardi, 1993; Friedman, 1999). 
Secondly, the sharing of proceeds by the law 
enforcement agencies encourages the current use of civil 
asset forfeiture. Local police organizations share the 
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proceeds of forfeiture with federal agencies. This 
incentive causes law enforcement officers to focus on drug 
offenders more than other types of criminals (Trebach and 
Inciardi, 1993). 
Finally, law enforcement performance evaluation 
measures traditionally measured the success of a narcotics 
agency in terms of the number of seizures produced by each 
officer (Green, 1996). With the advent of civil forfeiture, 
the success of a narcotics agency has simply shifted 
slightly so that success is measured by the amount of money 
seized. The eradication of drugs, or of drug trafficking, 
the supposed supreme goal of the United States drug policy 
has always been out of the reach of law enforcement 
agencies (Lynch, 2000; Holden-Rhodes, 1997). 
The ease with which law enforcement agencies can share 
in the proceeds of the drug business is one of the most 
controversial aspects of civil forfeiture (Benson and 
Rasmussen, 1996; Worrall, 2001). The equitable sharing 
policy introduced by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 
1984 requires cooperation among law enforcement agencies at 
federal, state, and local levels. This cooperation 
accomplishes three main objectives. First, it is intended 
to punish criminals by depriving them of the assets that 
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were used or gained by means of the criminal act. 
Deterrence is a corollary to this goal of punishment. 
Second, the establishment of cooperation among the various 
levels of law enforcement agencies promotes communication 
and the sharing of information between the agencies so that 
they can more effectively combat the drug problem. Finally, 
cooperative efforts between agencies often result in 
greater profits for those agencies due to the equitable 
sharing doctrine (Burnham, 1996; Levy, 1996). 
The drug policy affects a wide range of professionals, 
including police officers and other civil servants. 
However, asset forfeiture practices are frequently 
performed by police agencies at federal, state and local 
levels. In practice, local police utilize federal laws in 
order to be able to keep the money and property they seize. 
By turning the greater part of the seizures over to federal 
agencies, they avoid state laws where constitutional 
provisions require the forfeited property should be 
allocated to education (Dillon, 2000).  
Thus, not only can the sharing process bring together 
the joint efforts of local and federal agencies, it can 
also promote the adoption of local seizure by the federal 
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system (Aylesworth, 1991; Benson and Rasmussen, 1996; 
Worrall, 2001).  
In sum, this sharing process presents significant 
advantages in several situations. First, when there is a 
need for federal laws that enable forfeiture. Second, when 
local agencies do not have the necessary resources to take 
legal action. Finally, the practice of sharing helps in 
complex cases that require federal investigation 
(Aylesworth, 1991; Benson and Rasmussen, 1996). These 
advantages stem from the fact that no formal joint 
operation is required in order to share the proceedings. 
Local enforcement agencies may take the advantage of this 
provision through “adoptive” forfeiture. Local agencies ask 
the federal government to take over a case that cannot be 
forfeitable according to state law, but can be forfeitable 
through the use of federal law. Thus, state laws can be 
bypassed through this procedure, and local agencies receive 
up to twenty percent by simply turning their case over to 
the federal government (Benson, Rasmussen and Sollars, 
1995; Levy, 1996; Worrall, 2001). 
This adoption process that enabled police agencies to 
keep the proceeds from civil asset forfeiture was 
introduced by the Crime Control Act of 1984, (Cassidy, 
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1993; Benson et al. 1995; Burnham, 1996), and subsequently 
was challenged by some bureaucrats. The enactment of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 changed the terms of asset 
forfeiture that were introduced in the Act of 1984. 
Particularly, the 1988 Act attempted to repeal Section 
6077. It was basically concerned with the adoption process 
in which seized assets were diverted from other services, 
including education, to be funneled into the coffers of law 
enforcement agencies. However, attempts to repeal Section 
6077 of the 1984 Act were not successful (Benson and 
Rasmussen, 1996). 
Disproportionate Impact of Civil Asset Forfeiture 
(Profit-Seeking Motive) 
The practice of equitable sharing has enabled police 
agencies to keep the proceeds of forfeiture and has 
arguably changed the attitude of law enforcers towards the 
fight against crime. Asset forfeiture has become one of the 
main goals of police agencies. The money they seize goes 
towards buying new office furniture, paying overtime, and 
even buying new vehicles. All of these are ancillary 
expenses that do not directly contribute to the war on 
drugs (Cassidy, 1993; Miller and Selva, 1994; Benson and 
Rasmussen, 1996; Levy, 1996; Dunn, 2000). Because this 
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provision has enabled the channeling of seized assets to 
the agencies’ budgets, cooperation among law enforcement 
agencies has increased significantly (Benson and Rasmussen, 
1996). Some police agencies have also created forfeiture 
accounts, in which the money obtained from forfeitures in 
drug-related cases is used in narcotics buy operations 
(DEA, 2001; Hart, 2001).  
Moreover, it is claimed that law enforcers assess the 
value of their drug cases based on their potential income 
generation. There is no regard for the amount of drugs 
involved, or the importance of the trafficker. Police 
agencies have realized that seized cash is channeled into 
their budgets much faster than other types of assets, such 
as real estate or automobiles. Thus, a “reverse sting,” in 
which an undercover officer poses as a drug dealer, became 
a very important technique for law enforcers. The reverse 
sting enabled police agencies to pocket a large amount of 
money while arresting the persons who would be involved in 
the illegal act (Miller and Selva, 1994; Blumenson and 
Nilsen, 1998). 
Consequently, law enforcement agencies have come to 
consider civil asset forfeiture to be a useful tool. It 
provides an easy and lucrative income for their agencies 
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(Cassidy, 1993). Thus, the law enforcement agencies have 
gradually become dependent on civil asset forfeiture and 
have become actively involved in such adoptive forfeitures 
(Worrall, 2001). 
For instance, an analysis of more than 6000 federal 
cases involving drug-related asset forfeiture revealed that 
forfeiture laws have become an extremely important economic 
resource for the government. They have provided almost 
$500,000,000 annually, particularly after the 1984 
legislation that extended and reinforced forfeiture laws. 
The data used in the study included information obtained 
from the United States Marshal’s Service (USMS). The 
research covered a two-year period, namely the fiscal years 
of 1991 and 1992. That period of time was considered to 
have yielded the highest income due to federal asset 
forfeiture (Warchol et al. 1999).   
The data that were analyzed included detailed 
information about asset seizures and judicial proceedings 
in four different districts, namely the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Southern Districts of Florida and California, and 
the Northern District of Illinois. These four districts 
were selected for very particular reasons. The Florida and 
California districts were regarded as hot spots in terms of 
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illicit drug trafficking. The Michigan and Illinois 
districts, on the other hand, were located centrally, and 
were considered to exhibit dissimilar characteristics than 
the districts that were on the borders. The findings of the 
study revealed that conveyances and financial means were 
the main focus for all the districts in the study. The 
percentage of assets forfeited by way of administrative or 
civil proceedings was considerably higher than those 
forfeited in criminal proceedings (Warchol et al. 1999). 
Moreover, an examination of the difference between 
assets that were forfeited or not forfeited made it clear 
that the government considered the economic worth of the 
property to be an important indication of effectiveness. 
Another finding was that there have been major differences 
between the percentages of criminal forfeiture and civil 
forfeiture. Police agencies rarely used criminal 
forfeiture. Instead, they used civil forfeiture, 
particularly administrative forfeiture, which was 
considered to be a more competent, rapid, and cost-
effective approach. The apparent focus on conveyances may 
be interpreted as an attempt of the law enforcement 
agencies to immobilize illicit drug trafficking networks 
(Warchol et al. 1999).  
 67 
Other studies have used a “disguised observations 
method,” also known as a “complete-member-researcher” 
approach to uncover some remarkable findings. One such 
researcher worked as a confidential informant for police 
drug enforcement squads for one year. The drug enforcement 
agents knew neither the real identity of the researcher nor 
the goals of his research. Thus, data were based on the 
practices and observations of the researcher, who actually 
infiltrated the very elusive and secret narcotics divisions 
of law enforcement agencies. The researcher was involved in 
twenty-eight drug cases with various law enforcement 
departments, including metropolitan and urban law 
enforcement officers, state, city police and sheriffs’ 
departments (Miller and Selva, 1994). 
His disguised observations method provided the 
researcher with a better understanding of the priorities of 
the police in asset forfeiture practices. One of the 
undercover operations made it clear that potential profit 
involved was a greater priority to police than the amount 
of drugs they intercepted, or the nature of the drug 
dealer. Police became aware of a drug dealer who was trying 
to sell marijuana. At about the same time, they uncovered a 
distributor who was looking to buy a lesser amount of 
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marijuana than the former. Despite the fact that drug 
dealer was a previously convicted suspect and that his 
drugs would be put into circulation if not seized, the 
narcotics agents chose to pursue the case where they could 
employ a “reverse-sting.” They preferred the buyer because 
he owned a truck and had more than $700 that could be 
seized. Their decision was simply based on the potential 
cash profits they would receive from busting up the crime 
(Miller and Selva, 1994). 
Thus, a relatively small amount of profit was gained 
by the police while a larger amount of drugs were let go 
into circulation. A small-time dealer was arrested rather 
than a known suspect (Miller and Selva, 1994). This a 
perfect example of the claim that law enforcement officers 
are encouraged to base their decisions on the profits that 
they will gain from asset seizures, rather than on the 
effectiveness of their operations to deter or punish crime 
(Bertram et al. 1996). 
In another case, the police terminated a drug deal 
with a suspect who dealt cocaine and marijuana because the 
amount of drugs that was subject to the reverse sting was 
considered to be negligible by the supervisor. However, the 
supervisor later changed his mind about the limit and 
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attempted to reinitiate the same deal. By this time, 
however, the dealer had lost his confidence towards the 
informant\researcher. The supervisor then allowed the 
dealer to sell his drugs on the street, waiting until 
afterwards to seize the cash rather than seizing the drugs 
and keeping them out of the hands of users (Miller and 
Selva, 1994). 
In addition to problems like these, the profit-seeking 
attitudes of police agencies has resulted in competition 
among the law enforcers, sometimes harming the cooperation 
that is required to fight crime. A very important deal was 
terminated because the location of the deal fell into 
another agency’s jurisdiction. Although agents could have 
easily informed their counterparts so that a known suspect 
with more than two pounds of cocaine and a considerable 
amount of money could have been seized, they did not inform 
them. Finally, the police preferred to eradicate marijuana 
plants and seize $500 in valuable assets of a suspect 
without bringing him upon charges for growing marijuana. 
The researcher was stunned by this situation, and was told 
that the suspect would be prosecuted later, but he was not. 
The police were more interested in taking the suspects’ 
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money than prosecuting him for growing contraband (Miller 
and Selva, 1994). 
A recent study analyzed a 1998 national survey 
regarding law enforcement agencies, the criminal and civil 
regulations of the fifty states as well as the District of 
Columbia, and data from the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics. The study concluded that civil 
asset forfeiture was an important budgetary supplement for 
the law enforcement organizations. What is more, a 
considerable number of law enforcement agencies have become 
dependent on civil asset forfeiture (Worrall, 2001). 
Fairness of Civil Asset Forfeiture Implementations 
The practice of civil asset forfeiture in drug-related 
cases is an important example of the discretion used in 
positive law in the United States. One of the important 
problems that arises from civil forfeiture results from the 
value of the seized assets and the way to spend those 
assets (Abadinsky, 2001). In fact, it has been claimed that 
law enforcement officers believe that civil liberties get 
in the way of crime-fighting. They are powerful tools that 
enable citizens to interfere with government actions. Thus, 
law enforcement agencies will take any opportunity 
available to skirt around these protections, taking 
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whatever they can from people they believe to be criminals. 
The American criminal justice system works on the 
assumption that it is better to let ten guilty men go free 
than put one innocent man behind bars. This makes the task 
of police officers both difficult and discouraging. They 
have come to view the term “civil liberties” as a catch 
phrase defense attorneys use to save their clients from 
jail. Police have forgotten that civil liberties were put 
in place to protect the innocent from unreasonable arrest 
(Miller, 1996).  
Moreover, police are more likely to consider 
minorities to be drug users and potential criminals, thus, 
they disproportionately focus their efforts on minorities. 
According to these sub cultural assumptions, potential drug 
users are more likely to be African-Americans, and the 
statistics verify this perception by showing that the 
majority of prison inmates are African-Americans (Kappeler, 
et al. 2000). 
Consequently, police officers use “racial profiling” 
in their activities against illicit drugs. In a ten-month 
study conducted in 1991 on asset forfeiture and innocent 
property owners, an examination of judicial documents 
concerning 121 police stops in which drugs were not found 
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but money was seized showed that Hispanic, African-
American, and Asian people comprised an overwhelming 
majority of those cases, with seventy-seven percent 
(Schneider and Flaherty, 1991). 
An examination of 310 official declarations from 
twenty-eight dissimilar police agencies on profiling and 
seizures revealed that criminal profiling consisted of 
several doubtful assumptions that were not consistent with 
any kind of scientific explanation. Furthermore, profiling 
assumptions varied from one police agency to the other. For 
example, one agency might consider someone who leaves an 
aircraft first to be a potential drug courier due to his or 
her rush, while another agency would consider someone who 
leaves a plane last to be doubtful because of his or her 
attempt to seem unworried. Moreover, if someone leaves an 
airplane neither first nor last but among other people, he 
or she may be considered as suspicious due to their attempt 
to hide in the crowd. Suspicion also arises if a person’s 
destination or departure city is considered to be a source 
for illicit drugs (Schneider and Flaherty, 1991). 
In addition to these, there are other traits that are 
regarded as suspicious by police officers. These traits 
also vary greatly among different law enforcement agencies. 
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For example, walking rapidly may be considered suspicious 
by some agencies, while walking slowly may be considered 
suspicious by other agencies. In fact, police officers will 
cite these types of pseudo-criminalistic traits in order to 
justify a stop or arrest of a person who is a racial or 
ethnic minority (Schneider and Flaherty, 1991). 
The ten-month study also revealed the number of 
innocent property owners who have been harmed by the bad 
policy implementations of the law enforcement officers. The 
study revealed that people were presumed guilty. The study 
consisted of an examination of 25,000 seizures that were 
performed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
interviews with 1,600 defense lawyers, people who were 
victimized, police officers, prosecutors, and federal 
agents. It also included an examination of judiciary 
documents in 510 cases. The study concluded that as a 
result of civil asset forfeiture laws, the civil rights of 
a considerable number of Americans were violated and their 
properties were seized without any criminal conviction, but 
based solely on probable cause. Among those people whose 
property was seized by the federal government, only twenty 
percent were charged for criminal offenses (Schneider and 
Flaherty, 1991). A sheriff’s department in Volusia County 
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provides a particularly poignant example of police who 
abuse civil asset forfeiture laws. These officers stopped 
certain people on the highways of Florida on the grounds 
that they were drug couriers. They seized any cash found 
over $100, assuming that must have been drug money. The 
money was forfeit whether they found drugs or not (Reed, 
1992; Hay, 1996).  
At this point, it is worth noting that in most civil 
asset forfeiture cases, victims do not contest the loss of 
their assets. To do so would place an even greater 
financial burden on the claimant in order to contest the 
trial and recover the property back from the government. 
Moreover, sometimes the cost of the legal proceedings may 
well go beyond the cost of the seized assets. In short, 
legal costs are either too expensive to afford or they 
exceed the value of the seized assets (Levy, 1996; Warchol 
et al. 1999). For example, a cosmetics dealer had $9,460 
seized by the DEA based on probable cause. The law required 
that ten percent of the seized amount should be mailed to 
the government and the legal cost of the case was $2,000. 
In addition, the government extended the case urging him to 
terminate his contest. In another example, a couple’s 
mobile home worth $22,000 was seized upon their plea of 
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guilty for raising a few marijuana plants behind the home. 
Their lawyer charged them $400 to pursue the case, and the 
government required them to pay $2,500 in order to return 
their mobile home back. Thus, the victims had to take out a 
loan paying more than $150 a month to get their home back 
(Levy, 1996). 
The situation becomes worse when cash is involved in 
the seizure. The claimant must assert a claim on the cash 
within ten days, starting from the date of seizure. 
Therefore, law enforcers tend to seize cash, and they 
frequently focus on minorities who tend to have few legal 
resources. For example, in Florida, “highway robbery” took 
place on Interstate 95 where a sheriff’s department made 
stops based on probable cause. More than ninety percent of 
the stopped drivers were either Hispanic or African-
American. Over a three-year period, more than $8 million 
was seized. However, no drugs were found in seventy-six 
percent of the stops (Levy, 1996). 
 In sum, not only do the forfeiture laws harm the 
American justice system by encouraging unjust 
implementations of the laws, they also change the attitudes 
of police agencies towards the drug war by creating 
financial motivation among them. For example, the 
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establishment of the Asset Forfeiture Fund resulted in a 
major change in the ideology that motivated police, 
shifting from deterrence to basic, simple profit-seeking 
(Friedman, 1999; Ross, 2000). Also, civil forfeiture laws 
are applied to petty dealers and innocent people, whereas 
they were intended to be used against major drug 
traffickers. Consequently, according to a 1995 United 
States Sentencing Commission report, more than half of all 
federal-level convictions were small-time drug offenders, 
including drug sellers at street level and drug couriers. 
Moreover, among 20,000 drug offenders at the federal-level, 
only forty-one of them were considered to be as major drug 
traffickers in 1998 (Sterling, 2001). 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The war on drugs has had a huge impact, particularly 
on minorities in American society. It has levied a huge 
toll on society, increasing the costs of law enforcement, 
prisons, and treatment programs for addicts. One of the 
principle components of the drug war has been tougher 
sentencing practices, resulting in the incarceration of a 
considerable number of American citizens, particularly 
African-Americans (Kappeler, et al. 2000; Walker, 2001). 
Tougher sentencing practices were intended to deter drug 
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criminals. However, deterrence depends on certainty. These 
laws are biased in their application. Although mandatory 
minimum sentences, the most important components of tougher 
sentencing, resulted in an increase in the severity of the 
punishment, their race-based applications have noticeably 
lessened their certainty. As a result, their deterrent 
effects have been diminished (United States Sentencing 
Commission, 1991). 
 It is argued that new regulations are required in 
order to address problems that have arisen from civil asset 
forfeiture practices. First, the profit-seeking motive of 
the law enforcement agencies should be eliminated or at 
least it should be decreased. This could be accomplished 
through the elimination of the equitable sharing provision. 
Forfeited assets should be deposited in the Treasury 
Department’s general fund rather than the police agencies’ 
budget (Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998; Ross, 2000). 
 In addition, there should be amendments to the 
“adoption” process, in which local police handover their 
problematical cases to federal agencies in order to receive 
twenty percent of the seized assets. Because of this 
procedure, all the funds that would otherwise be allocated 
to the schools, according to state laws, are funneled to 
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the local police who call upon federal laws. Forfeiture 
should be used as an important weapon against crime, 
instead of an income raising mechanism for law enforcement 
agencies (Schneider and Flaherty, 1991; Reed, 1992). 
 Second, it is claimed that the only way to maintain 
the benefits forfeiture allows law enforcers and property 
owners is to keep the practice of forfeiture using it only 
in criminal cases (Schneider and Flaherty, 1991; Reed, 
1992). This way, asset forfeiture would be performed in 
conjunction with a criminal charge, and persons subject to 
forfeiture would consequently be afforded greater 
constitutional protection. Innocent property owners would 
not be hurt, and forfeiture laws would not be left up to 
the discretion of law enforcement officers (Reed, 1992).  
 The “Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000” 
requires stronger evidence than probable cause, and shifts 
the burden of proof from the innocent property owner to the 
federal government (Dunn, 2000; Cassella, 2001). The Act 
also allows for a joint innocent owner defense and the 
appointment of legal counsel for indigent people at the 
federal level (Ross, 2000; Barnet, 2001; Cassella, 2001; 
Worrall, 2001). What is more, the use of criminal 
forfeiture is encouraged by the Act (H.R. 1658, 2000; 
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Barnet, 2001). However, it is not binding on the States. 
Therefore, the Reform Act should be made binding on the 
States (Ross, 2000; Worrall, 2001).  
 Finally, even though the use of forfeiture in criminal 
cases only, is claimed to be the only way of maintaining 
the benefit of law enforcers and property owners, civil 
forfeiture should remain in effect. However, forfeiture 
should be used as an important weapon against crime, 
instead of an income raising mechanism for law enforcement 
agencies. Therefore, the so called “adoption” process 
should be eliminated. 
 The new law that requires stronger evidence than 
probable cause is believed to shift the burden of proof 
from the innocent property owners to the federal 
government. However, it is not binding on the States. 
Therefore, the Reform Act should be made binding on the 
States. This is mainly because primary actors of civil 










Abadinsky, H. (2001). Drugs: An introduction. CT: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Inc.  
Akers, R.L. (2000). Criminological theories: Introduction, 
evaluation, and application. Los Angeles: Roxbury 
Publishing Company.  
Aylesworth, G.N. (1991). Forfeiture of real property: An 
overview. Asset Forfeiture Series #14.Washington, DC: 
United States Bureau of Justice Assistance. 
Barnet, T. (2001). Legal fiction and forfeiture: An 
historical analysis of the civil asset forfeiture 
reform act. Duquesne University Law Review. Retrieved 
May 23, 2002, from http://web.lexis-nexis.com  
Bauman, R.E. (1995). Take it away. National Review. 
Retrieved June 27, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidwed/ovidweb 
Baur, M.J. (1996). Innocent owners and guilty property: 
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 20:279-293. 
Retrieved August 27, 2001, from 
http://ehostvgw21.epnet.com 
 81 
Benson, B.L., Rasmussen, D.W., & Sollars, D.L. (1995). 
Police bureaucracies, their incentives, and the war on 
drugs. Public Choice, 83:21-45. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Benson, B.L., & Rasmussen, D.W. (1996). Predatory public 
finance and the origins of the war on drugs. 
Independent Review, 1:163-190. Retrieved August 27, 
2001, from http://ehostvgw21.epnet.com 
Benson, B.L., & Rasmussen, D.W. (1998). The context of drug 
policy: An economic interpretation. Journal of Drug 
Issues. Retrieved September 19, 2001, from 
http://ehostvgw3.epnet.com 
Bentham, J. (1789). Introduction to the principles of 
morals and legislation. In R.C. Solomon & M.C. Murphy 
(Eds.), in What is Justice: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (pp.215-220). NY: Oxford University Press. 
Bertram, E., Blachman, K.S., & Andreas, P. (1996). Drug War 
Politics: The Price of Denial. London: California 
Library of Congress Press, Ltd.  
Blacher, R.E. (1994). Clearing the smoke from the 
battlefield: Understanding Congressional intent 
regarding the innocent owner provision of 21 U.S.C. 
881 (a) (7). Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology. 
 82 
Retrieved June 27, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidwed/ovidweb 
Blumenson, E., & Nilsen, E. (1998). The drug war’s hidden 
economic agenda. Nation. Retrieved July 02, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidwed/ovidweb 
Brand, R.L. (1996). Civil forfeiture as jeopardy: United 
States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).” Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy. Retrieved June 27, 
2001, from http://www.texshare.edu/ovidwed/ovidweb 
Brodey, J. (1997). The Supreme Court rejects Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment protection against the forfeiture 
of an innocent owner’s property. Journal of Criminal 
Law and & Criminology. Retrieved June 27, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidwed/ovidweb 
Burnham, D. (1996). Above the Law: Secret Deals, Political 
Fixes and Other Misadventures of the U.S. Department 
of Justice. New York: Scribner.  
Calero-Toledo Et Al. v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. No. 73-
157 416 U.S. 663; 94 S. Ct. 2080; 40 L. Ed. 2d 452; 
(1974) 
Cassella, S.D. (2001). The civil asset forfeiture reform 
act of 2000: Expanded government forfeiture authority 
and strict deadlines imposed on all parties. Journal 
 83 
of Legislation. Retrieved May 23, 2002, from 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com  
Cassidy, P. (1993). Without due process. The Progressive. 
Retrieved August 27, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidwed/ovidweb… 
Caulkins, J.P., Rydell, P.C., Schwabe, W.L., & Chiesa, J. 
(1997). Mandatory minimum drug sentences: Throwing 
away the key or the taxpayers’ money? Retrieved May 
23, 2002, from http://www.rand.org 
Cole, G.F., & Smith, C.E. (2001). The American system of 
criminal justice. (9th ed.). Stamford, CT: Wadsworth. 
Currie, E. (1998). Crime and punishment in America. New 
York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company, Inc.  
DEA. Controlled Substances Schedule. (2001). Retrieved May 
23, 2002, from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/schedule.pdf 
Department of Revenue of Montana, Petitioner v. Kurth Ranch 
Et Al. No. 93-144 (1994) 
Dillon, K. (2000, May 20). Cash in custody. A special 
report on police and drug money seizures: Police, 
federal agencies resist change. Kansas City Star. 
Retrieved May 02, 2001, from 
http://www.kcstar.com/projects/drugforfeit/new7.htm 
 84 
Dunn, K. (2000). Reining in forfeiture: Common sense reform 
in the war on drugs. Retrieved June 15, 2001, from 
http://www.pbs.org 
Eldredge, D.C. (1998). Ending the war on drugs: A solution 
for America. New York: Bridge Works Publishing Company 
Bridgehampton. 
Fann, L.E., Gordon, G.G., & Leach, A.W. (1993). How to 
Present the Forfeiture Case to the Prosecutor. Asset 
forfeiture series #16. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Assistance. 
Friedman, D. (1999). Why not hang them all: The virtues of 
inefficient punishment. The Journal of Political 
Economy. Retrieved May 16, 2002, from 
http://www.jstor.org/  
Goldsmith, M. (1992). Civil forfeiture: Tracing the 
proceeds of narcotics trafficking. Asset Forfeiture 
Series #1.Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. 
Goldsmith, M., & Lenck, W. (1992). Asset forfeiture: 
Protection of third-party rights. Asset Forfeiture 
Series #12.Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. 
 85 
Green, L. (1996). Policing places with drug problems. CA: 
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
Hart, K. (2001). Fade runs short on drug-buy money. 2001 
The Daily Independent, Inc. Retrieved August 27, 2001, 
from http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01.n1706.a02.html  
Hartman, V.E. (2001). Implementing an asset forfeiture 
program. FBI: Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved June 
15, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidweb/ovidweb… 
Hay, D. (1996). Highway robbery. World Press Review. 
Retrieved August 27, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidweb/ovidweb…  
Heching, M. (1993). Civil forfeiture and the innocent owner 
defense: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113S. 
CT.1126 (1993). Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 
Retrieved September 19, 2001, from 
http://ehostvgw21.epnet.com 
Holden-Rhodes, J.F. (1997). Sharing secrets: Open source 
intelligence and the war on drugs. CT: Praeger, 
Westport.  
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. In R.C. Solomon & M.C. Murphy 
(Eds.), in What is Justice: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (pp.63-73). NY: Oxford University Press. 
 86 
 
Hume, D. (1751). An enquiry concerning the principles of 
morals. In R.C. Solomon & M.C. Murphy (Eds.), in What 
is Justice: Classic and Contemporary Readings (pp.137-
141). NY: Oxford University Press. 
Inciardi, J. A. (1999). Criminal justice. (6th ed.) FL: 
Harcourt Brace & Company.  
Istralowitz, R.E., & Telias, D. (1998). Drug use, policy, 
and management. CT: Praeger, Westport.  
Janzen, S. (1990). Asset forfeiture: Informants and 
undercover investigations. Asset forfeiture series 
#13. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. 
Jenkins, S. (2001). The war our leaders are happy to 
forget. 2001Times Newspapers Ltd. Retrieved May 16, 
2002, from 
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01.n1694.a13.html 
Jensen, E.L., & Gerber, J. (1996). The civil forfeiture of 
assets and the war on drugs: Expanding criminal 
sanctions while reducing due process protections. 
Crime and Delinquency. Retrieved June 27, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidweb/ 
 87 
Jensen, E.L., & Gerber, J. (Eds.) (1998). The new war on 
drugs: Symbolic politics and criminal justice policy. 
OH: Anderson Publishing Co. 
Johnson, B.L. (2000). Purging the cruel and unusual: The 
autonomous excessive fines clause and desert-based 
constitutional limits on forfeiture after United 
States v. Bajakajian. University of Illinois Law 
Review. Retrieved September 19, 2001, from 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com 
Jordan, D.C. (1999). Drug politics, dirty money and 
democracies. OK: University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 
Publishing Division of the University. 
Kappeler, V.E., Blumberg, M., & Potter, G.W. (2000). The 
mythology of crime and criminal justice. IL: Waveland 
Press, Inc.  
Larson, A. (2000). Criminal forfeiture. Expert Library. 
Retrieved June 21, 2001, from 
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/pubarticles/Criminal/
Forfeiture.html 
Levy, L.W. (1996). A license to steal: The forfeiture of 
property. NC: The University of North Carolina Press.  
Locke, J. (1690). Second treatise of government. In R.C. 
Solomon & M.C. Murphy (Eds.), in What is Justice: 
 88 
Classic and Contemporary Readings (pp.74-80). NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lyman, D.M., & Potter, W.G. (1998). Drugs in society: 
Causes, concepts and control. OH: Anderson Publishing 
Co.  
Lynch, T. (2000). After prohibition: An adult approach to 
drug policies in the 21st century. Washington, D.C.: 
Cato Institute.  
Meeker-Lowry, S. (1996). Asset forfeiture. Zmagazine. 
Retrieved June 21, 2001, from 
http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/jan96meeker.htm 
Miller, R.L. (1996). Drug warriors and their prey: From 
police power to police state. CT: Westport, Praeger.  
Miller, J.M., & Selva, L.H. (1994). Drug Enforcement’s 
Double-Edged Sword: An Assessment of Asset Forfeiture 
Programs. In L.K. Gaines & P.B. Kraska (Eds.), in 
Drugs, Crime and Justice: Contemporary Perspectives 
(pp.275-296). IL: Waveland Press, Inc.  
Noya, S.T. (1996). Hoisted by their own petard: Adverse 
inferences in civil forfeiture. Journal of Criminal 
Law & Criminology. Retrieved July 02, 2001, from 
http://www.texshare.edu/ovidweb/ovidweb… 
 89 
Nozick, R. (1974). Philosophical explanations. In R.C. 
Solomon & M.C. Murphy (Eds.), in What is Justice: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings (pp.212-215). NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Office of National Drug Control Policy. (n.d.). The 
national drug control strategy, 2000 annual report. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
Reed, T.G. (1992). American forfeiture law: Property owners 
meet the prosecutor. Policy Analysis, No. 179. 
September 29, 1992. Retrieved June 15, 2001, from 
http://www.cato.org//pubs/pas/pa-179.html 
Richard Lyle Austin, Petitioner v. United States No.92-
6073, 509 U.S. 602; 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).   
Ross, D.B. (2000). Civil forfeiture: A fiction that offends 
due process. Regent University Law Review, Retrieved 
September 19, 2001, from http://web.lexis-nexis.com 
Schaler, J. A. (1998). (Ed.) Drugs: Should we legalize, 
decriminalize, or deregulate? Amherst, N.Y.: 
Prometheus Books. 
Schmalleger, F. (2001). Criminal law today. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.  
 90 
Schneider, A., & Flaherty, M.P. (1991). Presumed guilty. 
The Pittsburgh Press Co. Retrieved June 15, 2001, from 
http://256.com/gray/presume 
Schroeder, W.R. (1996). Civil forfeiture: Recent Supreme 
Court cases. Retrieved June 15, 2001, from 
http://209.52.183.182/agitator/fbileb.htm 
Sterling, E. (2001). And justice for all? Our anti-drug 
sentencing is perverse. Common Dreams, News Center, 
Retrieved April 08, 2002, from 
http://commondreams.org/views/050900-101.htm  
Swanson, R.C., Taylor, R.W., & Territo, L. (2001). Police 
administration: Structures, processes, and behavior. 
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Tina B. Bennis, Petitioner v. Michigan No. 94-8729 (Bennis 
v. Michigan 116 S. Ct. 994(1996) 
Trebach, A.S., & Inciardi, J.A. (1993). Legalize it?: 
Debating American drug policy. The American University 
Press.  
United States Sentencing Commission (1991). Special report 
to the Congress: Mandatory minimum penalties in the 
federal criminal justice system. Retrieved April 08, 
2002, from http://www.ussc.gov/manmin/manmin51.htm 
 91 
United States v. Halper No. 87-1383, 490 U.S. 435; 109 S. 
Ct. 1892; 104 L. Ed. 2d 487; (1989)   
United States, Petitioner v. A Parcel Of Land, Buildings, 
Appurtenances And Improvements, Known as 92 Buena 
Vista Avenue, Rumson, New Jersey, Et Al. No. 91-781  
United States, Petitioner v. Guy Jerome Ursery No. 95-345-
518 U.S. 267; 116 S.Ct.2135; 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996)  
United States, Petitioner v. Hosep Krikor Bajakajian No. 
96-1487 (1998).  
United States, Petitioner v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property Et Al. No. 92-1180 (1993) 
Vallance, T.R. (1993). Prohibition’s second failure: The 
quest for a rational and humane drug policy. Westport, 
CT: Praeger. 
Walker, S. (2001). Sense and nonsense about crime and 
drugs: A policy guide. (Fifth Ed.) Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. 
Warchol, G.L., Payne, D.M., & Johnson, B.R. (1999). Federal 
forfeiture: Law, policy and practice. Justice 
Professional, 11:pp.403-425. Retrieved August 27, 
2001, from http://ehostvgw21.epnet.com 
Watterson, S.J. (1997). Putting the Halper genie back in 
the bottle: Examining United States v. Ursery in light 
 92 
of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. Brigham Young 
University Law Review, Retrieved September 19, 2001, 
from http://ehostvgw21.epnet.com 
Weinreb, L.L (Ed.) (2001). Leading Constitutional Cases of 
Criminal Justice. New York Foundation Press. 
Whitebread, C.H., & Slobogin, C. (2000). Criminal 
procedure: An analysis of cases and concepts. New York 
Foundation Press. Fourth Edition. 
Worrall, J.L. (2001). Addicted to the drug war: The role of 
civil asset forfeiture as a budgetary necessity in 
contemporary law enforcement. Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 29:171-187. Elsevier Science Ltd. 
 
